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Abstract. The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas production predicts a
monotonically declining saving rate, when reasonably calibrated. Ample empirical evidence,
however, shows that the transition paths of most countries’ saving rates exhibit a statistically
significant hump-shaped pattern. Prior literature shows that CES production may imply a
hump-shaped pattern of the saving rate (Goméz, 2008). However, the implied magnitude of
the hump falls short of what is seen in empirical data. We introduce two non-standard features
of preferences into a neoclassical growth model with CES production: hyperbolic discounting
and short planning horizons. We show that, in contrast to the commonly accepted argument,
in general (except for the special case of logarithmic utility) a model with hyperbolic
discounting is not observationally equivalent to one with exponential discounting. We also
show that our framework implies a hump-shaped saving rate dynamics that is consistent with
empirical evidence. Hyperbolic discounting turns out to be a major factor explaining the
magnitude of the hump of the saving rate path. Numerical simulations employing a
generalized class of hyperbolic discount functions, which we term regular discount functions,
support the results.
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1. Introduction

This paper analyzes the impact of hyperbolic discounting on transitional dynamics of the
saving rate. It is well known that the standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas
technology, exponential discounting, and isoelastic preferences – a common framework in
growth theory – exhibits a monotone transition path of the saving rate. For a reasonable
calibration, it exhibits a monotonically declining transition path as an economy develops
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, p.135 ff.). This property, however, is counterfactual. As is
discussed in Section 2, ample empirical evidence suggests two regularities: an increase in the
saving rate as an economy experiences growth of per capita income; and a non-monotone
transition path, featuring a statistically significant hump.

The problem of the counterfactual prediction of transitional dynamics of the saving rate by the
standard growth model (with Cobb-Douglas technology) has been addressed in the literature.
Gómez (2008), among others, provides a solution by introducing a more flexible CES
production technology. For important situations, the model with CES technology implies a
humped transition path of the saving rate. This hump is confirmed by a number of numerical
simulations in the present paper. However, the numerical simulations also suggest that for
reasonable calibrations, the implied hump in the transitional dynamics of the saving rate has a
significantly smaller amplitude than suggested by the empirical evidence.

In this paper, we modify the model with CES technology in two important respects. First, we
allow preferences to exhibit hyperbolic discounting (in which case the pure rate of time
preference declines over time). Empirically, there is abundant evidence for the pure rate of
time preference to decline over time, i.e., for hyperbolic discounting (cf., e.g., Ainslie 1992,
and Laibson 1997). Discount rates are time sensitive, exhibiting a “present bias”: people tend
to put especially high weight on a given gain or loss delayed in the near future as opposed to
the same gain or loss delayed in the more distant future. Households do not foresee that their
discount rate declines in delay. This introduces time-inconsistency. Second, households
exhibit a short planning horizon (as opposed to an infinite planning horizon). Along the lines
of Caliendo and Aadland (2007), Findley and Caliendo (2009), Caliendo and Findley (2014),
and Findley and Caliendo (2014), naïve households, who are not aware of their future
impatience, revise their initial intertemporal consumption plans at every instant in time.
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Within this framework, we argue that hyperbolic discounting (and short-term planning) – by
adding a hyperbolic discounting effect to the usual substitution- and income effects –
magnifies the amplitude of the hump of the transitional path of the saving rate. Numerical
simulations show that for reasonable calibrations, the implied hump in the transitional
dynamics of the saving rate has amplitude corresponding to what is suggested by empirical
evidence.

Specifically, we show the following three results. First, if the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption, θ , differs from unity, our framework is not observationally equivalent with a
framework with exponential discounting. Intuitively, if θ ≠ 1 , the propensity to consume out
of wealth is affected by both the discount rate and the rate of interest. As long as the rate of
interest changes over time, the propensity to consume under hyperbolic discounting develops
differently from that under exponential discounting. Given the lack of observational
equivalence, the transitional paths of the saving rate differ between our model and one with
exponential discounting. Second, as long as per capita income rises over time, the hyperbolic
discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate relative to a framework with exponential
discounting, and thereby tends to heighten the saving hump. Intuitively, a declining discount
rate over time affects the intertemporal substitution effect. At any per capita income level,
future consumption becomes more attractive as it is less strongly discounted relative to
exponential discounting. This hyperbolic discounting effect encourages a higher saving rate.
Third, by presenting numerical simulations, we quantify the impact of hyperbolic discounting
on the hump of the transitional path of the saving rate. For reasonable calibrations, it is shown
that the implied hump has an amplitude of around 5 percentage points, which is well in accord
with empirical evidence. With exponential discounting, in contrast, the amplitude of the hump
amounts to about one percentage point. In course of the numerical simulations, we introduce
the class of regular discount functions. This class captures cases in which the second order
growth rate of the discount rate is a constant multiple of the first-order growth rate. Most
discounting specifications employed in the prior literature are special cases of the regular
discount function, notably exponential discounting (where the discount rate is constant), lessthan-exponential discounting, classical hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie 1992), or zero
discounting.
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This paper is related to several previous studies on saving rate dynamics. Gómez (2008) and
Smetters (2003) introduce a CES production technology with elasticities of substitution
differing from one. They show that a CES between capital and labor below (above) unity
might imply a hump shaped (inverse-hump shaped) transitional path of the saving rate. Litina
and Palivos (2010) introduce endogenous technical progress. Both Gómez (2008) and Litina
and Palivos (2010) identify conditions under which there is overshooting (undershooting)
behavior of the transition paths of the saving rate. Antràs (2001) shows that the introduction
of a minimum consumption level (Stone-Geary preferences) may also imply a hump shaped
savings profile. In his model, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution rises over time, which
first weakens the substitution effect and later on, the substitution effect dominates the income
effect, thereby generating a hump shaped transitional path. He also provides econometric
evidence in support of the humped transitional path of the saving rate both in OECD countries
and in a larger cross-section of countries.

The following Section 2 provides empirical evidence supporting two observations: as per
capita income grows, an economy’s saving rate tends to rise, at least over some period; and
the transitional path of a country’s saving rate behaves non-monotonically over time and
typically exhibits a hump in the order of about 5 percentage points. Section 3 discusses two
aspects of hyperbolic discounting. First, it introduces regular discount functions and shows
that most discount functions found in the literature are special cases of regular discount
functions. Second, it argues that a sensible comparison of experiments with hyperbolicversus- exponential discount functions requires the same overall level of impatience. Section
4 presents the model with hyperbolic discounting and short planning horizons. Based on the
model, the main qualitative results are shown. Section 5, presents numerical simulations
investigating the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the saving rate hump. The section
shows that for reasonable calibrations, the saving rate hump amounts to an amplitude of
roughly 5 percentage points under hyperbolic discounting (in accordance with empirical
evidence), in contrast to roughly one percentage point under exponential discounting
(contrary to empirical evidence). Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix contains a number of
derivations and proofs of propositions.
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2. The behavior of the saving rate: Empirical evidence

Data on gross national saving rates suggest two regularities: as a country develops, its saving
rate tends to increase, at least over some range; and, over time, saving rate paths behave nonmonotonically and typically exhibit a hump.

2.1 Rising saving rates along transitional paths

Maddison (1992) provides evidence for 11 countries whose savings account for about half of
world savings. He finds that over the last hundred-twenty years, the saving rates of all but one
country (U.S.A.) increased substantially over time. Table 1, which is based on Barro and Salai-Martin (2004), provides empirical evidence for national saving rates.

Table 1. Gross national saving rates (percent)
Period

Australia

Canada

France

India

Japan

Korea

U.K.

U.S.A.

1870-89

11.2

9.1

12.8

-

-

-

13.9

19.1

1890-09

12.2

11.5

14.9

-

12.0

-

13.1

18.4

1910-29

13.6

16.0

-

6.4

17.1

2.4

9.6

18.9

1930-49

13.0

15.6

-

7.7

19.8

-

4.8

14.1

1950-69

24.0

22.3

22.8

12.2

32.1

5.9

17.7

19.6

1970-89

22.9

22.1

23.4

19.4

33.7

26.2

19.4

18.5

Source: Barro, Sala-i-Martin (2004, p.15)

In all countries, except for the United States, present saving rates are significantly above their
levels in late nineteenth century. Similar evidence is seen in East Asia for the last half
century.
Table 2. Gross national saving rates in East Asian countries (percent)
Period

Hong Kong Taipei

Singapore

Malaysia

Thailand

Indonesia Philippines

1960’s

31

14

8

25

22

7

17

1970’s

32

27

35

29

26

19

21

1980’s

34

31

42

33

26

33

20

1993

37

28

50

41

35

34

14

Source: Leipziger and Thomas (1997)
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With the exception of the Philippines, gross national saving rates have increased in the Asian
newly industrialized countries over the last fifty years, as shown in Table 2. Along the same
lines, Loayza et al. (2000) show for 98 countries that private saving rates rise with the level of
real per capita income.

2.2 Hump in the saving rate along transitional paths

That the gross saving rates are lower in the nineteen eighties than earlier is a well documented
regularity (cf. Shafer et al. 1992). Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1999) as well as Antràs (2001)
demonstrate that for most of 24 OECD countries, as well as for the OECD as a whole, the
transitional paths of the saving rates exhibit a statistically significant hump when considering
the last half century. Maddison (1992) shows that in many countries, after World War II, the
saving rate exhibits overshooting. Similar trends are reported by Bosworth et al. (1991),
Christiano (1989), Chari et al. (1996), and Tease et al. (1991). Specifically, Antràs (2001, p.1)
finds that “there is clear evidence of a hump shape in the series. This is confirmed … where
the series is detrended, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, to remove business cycle
fluctuations. Different tests on the series corroborated the statistical significance of the
hump”.

More recent data from the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts
data files confirm these findings, as shown in Figure 1. The figure shows gross savings as a
share of the GDP for OECD member countries (all members, and a subgroup of high-income
countries) as well as for the world as a whole. The hump of the saving rate is obvious in the
two diagrams showing the savings rates for OECD countries over time.

6

Figure 1. Gross savings as percentage of GDP (1965 – 2012)
Source: World Bank indicators: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts
data files.
Notes. Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers;
High-income economies are those in which 2012 GNI per capita was $12,616 or more.

The hump of the saving rate over time is less pronounced in the diagram showing the saving
rates for the world as a whole. In line with the argument pursued in this paper, many countries
experience a saving rate hump in course of developing from a low- to a medium-/high income
country (see Antràs 2001). In the diagram exhibiting world data, the transitional paths of
countries with a high GDP (and a declining saving rate) are aggregated with those of countries
with a low GDP (and an increasing saving rate). As a consequence, the saving rate hump for
the period of the last half century is less pronounced for the world as a whole than for a group
of similar countries (OECD) or for individual countries.

Remark. (Magnitude of the “saving rate hump”) Considering aggregate data for developed
countries in the last 50 years, Figure 1 suggests a saving rate hump of around 5 percentage
points. In the following, we argue that – in contrast with a reasonably calibrated model with
exponential discounting – our framework with hyperbolic discounting implies a saving rate
hump of the right magnitude.

3. Hyperbolic discounting

Psychologists and behavioral economists have established the fact that a household’s discount
rate declines over time (cf., e.g., Ainslie 1992, and Laibson 1997, Thaler 1981). In his seminal
paper, Thaler (1981) reports that when individuals are given a choice between one apple today
and two tomorrow, most choose one apple today. However, when individuals are given a
7

choice between one apple in 50 days versus two apples in 51 days, the same group of
decision-makers choose two apples in violation of the stationarity of the discount rate. As a
conclusion, the pure rate of time preference is considered to decline in delay (time).
Accordingly, we allow the discount rate (pure rate of time preference), ρτ , to depend on
delay. In the special case of exponential discounting, ρτ = ρ is stationary. In the more general
case of hyperbolic discounting, ρτ declines in delay, τ . We use the notation ρ t t0 (or simply

ρτ ) for an individual’s discount rate of date t as seen from date t0 , that is, for a delay of
τ = t − t0 periods.
t − t0

We define a household’s discount function by D (t − t0 ) ≡ e

−

∫
0

ρ s ds

, or equivalently, by

τ

D (τ ) ≡ e

∫

− ρ s ds
0

. For τ = 0 , D (0) = 1 , regardless of whether an individual is an exponential or a

hyperbolic discounter. The discount rate, then, is the rate at which the discount function
declines in delay: ρτ = −

D
D τ
. For an exponential discounter, D (τ ) ≡ e − ρ τ implying − τ =
ρ.
Dτ
Dτ

3.1 Regular hyperbolic discounting

In the following, we specify a rather general class of discount functions that encompasses
most special cases employed in the prior literature. Following the concepts employed by
Groth et al. (2010), we call this class the class of regular discount functions. This class is
defined by the property that the second-order growth rate of the discount function is
proportional to the first-order growth rate.
The first-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by g D =
D τ / Dτ =
− ρτ < 0 . The
second-order growth rate of the discount factor is given by=
g 2,D g=
ρτ / ρτ .
D / gD
Following Groth et al. (2010), we call discount functions regular, if
g 2,D β g D , β ≥ 0 ,
=
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(1)

where the constant β is called the hyperbolic discounting coefficient. Given D0 = 1 , the
second order differential equation (1) has the unique solution

ρ

0
.
Dτ =
(1 + ρ 0 βτ ) −1/ β , ρτ =
1 + ρ 0 βτ

(2)

The regular discount functions (2) encompass a number of special cases, depending on the
specific value of the hyperbolic discounting coefficient. First, if β = 0 , ρτ = ρ 0 . This is the
case of conventional exponential discounting. Second, if β > 0 , the discount rate declines in

τ . This is the case of hyperbolic discounting. If β = 1 , Dτ= (1 + ρ 0τ ) −1 . This is the case of
classical hyperbolic discounting. 2 As the hyperbolic discounting coefficient rises, the rate of
decline of the discount rate becomes larger, and as the hyperbolic discounting coefficient
approaches infinity, the discount rate declines to zero instantly. Table 3 summarizes regular
discount functions.

Table 3. Regular discount functions

β

ρτ

Dτ

Regular discounting (general)

β ≥0

ρ 0 / (1 + ρ 0 βτ )

(1 + ρ 0 βτ ) −1/ β

Exponential discounting

β =0

ρ0

e − ρ0τ

Classical hyperbolic discounting

β =1

ρ 0 / (1 + ρ 0τ )

1 / (1 + ρ 0τ )

No-discounting

β →∞

0

1

Figure 2 shows regular time paths of the discount rate for various values of the hyperbolic
discounting coefficient. The figure illustrates that these paths capture the whole spectrum of
discount rate paths between exponential discounting, less-than-exponential (that is,
hyperbolic) discounting, and no discounting at all.

2

In the original, classical psychological literature, hyperbolic discount functions like 1 / τ or (1 + ρ 0τ ) −1 were

used (Ainslie, 1992).

9

Figure 2. Time paths of the discount rate with ρ 0 = 0.03 .

3.2 Hyperbolic- versus exponential discounting: a controlled experiment

In the subsequent sections, we argue that hyperbolic discounting is the key ingredient for
explaining the magnitude of empirically observed humps of transitional paths of the saving
rate. With exponential discounting alone, the magnitude of the humps cannot be explained.
This raises one question. How can a model with exponential discounting be sensibly
compared with one with hyperbolic discounting? Findley and Caliendo (2014) and Caliendo
and Findley (2014) argue that psychologists have always used the “overall level of
impatience” as a key measure. They argue that for a comparison to be sensible (a controlled
experiment) the overall level of impatience must be the same for exponential and hyperbolic
consumers. Experiments that do not control for the overall level of impatience may implicate
spurious results that are entirely due to different overall levels of impatience – not to
hyperbolic, as opposed to exponential discounting. 3
Let h ∈ 

++

be the number of periods characterizing an individual’s planning horizon. For

t ∈ [ 0, h ] , the overall level of impatience, I ( h ) , is given by the area above the discounting
curve D (τ ) and below one (see Figure 3, below). That is,

3

As shown below, generally, there is no observational equivalence between exponential- and hyperbolic

discounting.
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h

I ( h ) ≡ ∫ 1 − D (τ ) dτ .

(3)

0

Consider an exponential and a hyperbolic discount function: DE (τ ) , and DH (τ ) . Then, the
overall level of impatience is the same if and only if
h

h

∫ 1 − DE (τ ) dτ =
∫ 1 − DH (τ ) dτ
0

0

h

⇔

h

∫ DE (τ ) dτ =
∫ DH (τ ) dτ .
0

(4)

0

Considering (2), for any given ρ 0 ≡ ρ H 0 , (4) allows for calculating that specific value of the
exponential discount rate, ρ E , for which the overall level of impatience for the planning
period t ∈ [ 0, h ] is the same. Figure 3 shows one example for
=
β 50,
=
h 20 and ρ H 0 = 0.06 .
According to (4), the “controlled” value of the exponential discount rate corresponds to

ρ E = 0.0064 (see Appendix).

Figure 3. Exponential- and hyperbolic discount functions with the same overall level of impatience:

=
β 50,
=
h 20, =
ρ H 0 0.06,=
ρ E 0.0064 .
In the following analysis, we distinguish between uncontrolled experiments not satisfying (4)
and controlled experiments satisfying (4).
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4. The neoclassical growth model with hyperbolic discounting and short-term planning

We modify the standard neoclassical growth model in that we allow preferences to exhibit
two non-standard features. First, naïve individuals may discount hyperbolically rather than
exponentially. They consider their future discount rates to be lower than the present one.
However, when future arrives, they realize that their discount rate, then, is higher than
planned. That is, hyperbolic discounting introduces time-inconsistency. Second, individuals
exhibit a short planning horizon. That is, they are not planning from t0 to infinity, they rather
plan from t0 to some finite period t0 + h . In accordance with the individuals’ naïveté, they not
only consider their discount rate to be constant, they also consider the time t0 - wage and
interest rates to remain constant during their short planning horizon at their t0 levels. As
shown below, due to time-inconsistency, individuals re-optimize and form new plans at every
instant t . Following the procedure introduced by Caliendo and Aadland (2007), and Findley
and Caliendo (2009), we provide an exact analytical solution to this growth model with
hyperbolic discounting and short-term planning, in which consumers form time-inconsistent
saving plans. In the subsequent subsection, we consider the impact of hyperbolic discounting
and short-term planning on the transitional dynamics of the saving rate.

4.1 The model

4.1.1 Households

The economy is populated with a large number, Lt , of identical, naïve, infinitely lived
households. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor per unit of time. A
household’s preferences are described by an instantaneous CRRA utility function with
absolute elasticity of marginal utility of consumption equal to θ ≥ 0 . At every date t , a
household is planning ahead for h ∈ 

++

periods (short-term planning) and plans a sequence

of consumption {ct }tt + h so as to maximize the present value of intertemporal utility
0

0

=
U (t0 ; h )

t0 + h

∫
t0

ct1−θ − 1
Lt D (t − t0 ) dt , t ∈ [t0 , t0 + h ]
1−θ
12

(5)

subject to the flow budget constraint
kt = ( rt − n )kt + wt − ct ,

kt0 > 0 given,

t ∈ [t0 , t0 + h ]

(6)

– where k , w, r respectively denote capital per capita, wage rate and the interest rate – and
the terminal condition
kt0 + h = 0 .

(7)

Two remarks are in order. First, in (5), Lt = e nt represents the population size with n ≥ 0
representing the exogenous growth rate of the population. Furthermore, the discount function
D (t − t0 ) is considered to be a regular discount function as given by (2). This discount
function encompasses the special case of exponential discounting as the limit when the
hyperbolic discounting coefficient β approaches zero.

Second, at every point t , a household solves a short-horizon (fixed-endpoint) control
problem. The solution to this optimal control problem is planned consumption from the
perspective of t0 . The (fixed-endpoint) terminal condition kt0 + h = 0 indicates that the
household is concerned only with the “next” h periods. It does not imply that wealth (capital)
is actually equal to zero at t0 + h , as the household’s planning horizon is continuously sliding
forward. As the planning horizon is sliding forward, previous consumption plans are
invalidated, and the household re-optimizes and updates its consumption plan at every t. That
is, although a household plans to exhaust its resources within h periods, it never actually
exhausts its resources in finite time, as it keeps re-planning its consumption plans.
At t = t0 , the Hamiltonian of the control problem becomes:

H ( ct=
, kt , µt ; t0 )

ct1−θ − 1 nt
e D (t − t0 ) + µt [( rt − n )kt + wt − ct ] , t ∈ [ t0 , t0 + h ] .
1−θ
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(8)

As demonstrated in the Appendix, the optimal consumption plan – as seen from date t0 – is
given by:

c (t | t0 )

t0 + h
ˆ
kt0 + ∫ w τ e − R (τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 ) dτ
t0

∫

t0 + h

t0

θ −1 ˆ
−
R (τ ,t0 ) −γ t0 + n /θ τ
1/θ
θ

D (τ − t0 ) e

e R ( t ,t0 )/θ L1/t θ e −γ t D (t − t0 )1/θ ,
ˆ

dτ

(9)

t

where Rˆ (t , t0 ) ≡ ∫ ( rt0 − n )dt =( rt0 − n )(t − t0 ) , as households consider the rate of interest – as
t0

seen from t0 – fixed. A tilde denotes units of effective labor. Let the exogenous rate of
technical progress be given by γ , then: xt ≡ xt e −γ t , x ∈ {k , w, c} (see also below). Due to
time-inconsistency, the household follows this consumption plan only at t = t0 . So, we
consider the envelope, by setting all t = t0 . In the resulting expression, we then replace t0 by
t , which directly yields the exact analytical solution to this optimal control problem in which
naïve consumers form time-inconsistent saving- and consumption plans.
t +h
kt + ∫ w t e − ( rt −γ −n )(τ −t ) dτ

ct =

t

∫

t +h

t

1/θ

D (τ − t ) e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t )
 θ


(10)

dτ

Equation (10) presents optimal consumption of a short-sighted household with hyperbolic
discounting. Consumption is derived as the envelope of infinitely many initial values from a
continuum of planned time paths. The numerator of (10) represents total (physical and
human) wealth, and the denominator represents the inverse of the propensity to consume out
of total wealth. Specifically, let

∆≡∫

t +h

t

D (τ − t )1/θ e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t )
 θ


dτ ,

(11)

then, the propensity to consume out of total wealth is given by ∆ −1 , and equation (10) reads
t +h
∆ −1  kt + ∫ w t e − ( rt −γ −n )(τ −t ) dτ  .
ct =


t
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The important insight from (10) consists in the fact that – as the propensity to consume
generally depends on calendar time t via rt – there exists no observational equivalence
between exponential- and hyperbolic discounting. By observational equivalence, we mean
that for every hyperbolic discount function DH (τ ) there exists an exponential discount
function DE (τ ) so that the observed consumption paths are the same under both discount
functions.
Proposition 1. Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon, h ∈ 

++

, and

θ ≠ 1 , and a time-dependent rate of interest rt . Then, the model with hyperbolic discounting
is not observationally equivalent to a corresponding model with exponential discounting.

Proof. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, observational equivalence holds. Then, for some
date t0 it must be true that

∫

t0 + h

t0

1/θ

DH (τ − t0 ) e

 θ −1

rt − n (τ −t0 )
−
 θ 0 

t0 + h

dτ =−
∫ DE (τ t0 ) e
1/θ

 θ −1

rt − n (τ −t0 )
−
 θ 0 

t0

dτ

(12)

Note that the discount functions do not depend on calendar time t0 (by definition, they only
depend on delay). Also, observe that the weight e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t0 )
 θ 0 

changes in calendar time as

long as the rate of interest is not stationary. Therefore, if (12) holds at some date t0 , since
generally DH (τ − t0 ) ≠ DE (τ − t0 ) , it is not possible that (12) also holds at t ≠ t0 , a
contradiction. ||

Proposition 1 contrasts sharply with the commonly accepted argument that a model with
hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to one with exponential discounting (cf.
Barro 1999). Based on the important result established by Proposition 1, we will investigate
the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the “savings hump,” below.

Corollary 1. (Observational equivalence)
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Consider a naïve household with a short planning horizon, h ∈ 

++

, and logarithmic utility

θ = 1 . Then, the model with hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent to a
corresponding model with exponential discounting.
Corollary 1 can immediately be seen when setting θ = 1 in (12). With logarithmic utility, for
every hyperbolic discount function there exists an exponential discount function so that the
observed consumption paths are the same under both discount functions. Below, we will
therefore not consider the special case of logarithmic utility. For hyperbolic discounting and
short-term planning to have an impact on the “savings hump,” we will restrict attention to

θ ≠ 1 (generally to θ > 1 , see below).
It is worth noting that observational equivalence does not imply that a controlled experiment
is pursued. The mere fact that there exists an exponential discount function that gives rise to
the same observed consumption path as the hyperbolic discount function does not imply that
the overall level of discounting is the same under both discount functions (cf. (4)).

Corollary 2. (Observational equivalence and a controlled experiment)
(i) If and only if θ = 1 , observational equivalence meets the requirement of a controlled
experiment; that is, the overall level of discounting is the same under both discount functions.
(ii) If the rate of interest is stationary, rt = r , observational equivalence may occur. But as
long as θ ≠ 1 , the overall level of discounting between a hyperbolic- and an exponential
discount function differs.

4.1.2 Production and the market economy

Output, Y , is produced via the CES technology

=
Yt A α K t(σ −1)/σ + (1 − α )(Tt Lt )(σ −1)/σ 

σ /(σ −1)

, A > 0, 0 < α < 1, σ > 0 ,

(13)

where L is labor input, K is capital input, and T is an index of labor-augmenting
productivity that evolves through exogenous disembodied technical change:
Tt eγ t , γ ≥ 0 .
=
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(14)

Parameter α represents the weight of capital in production, and parameter σ denotes the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.

We consider a closed economy so that national income accounting implies
Y=
Ct + I t ,
t

(15)

where Ct is aggregate consumption. Then, the capital stock develops according to
K t = Yt − Ct − δ K t , δ > 0 ,

(16)

where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital.

Let a tilde denote variables in units of effective labor (TL) . Then, production function (13)
becomes
σ /(σ −1)
,
=
y t A α kt(σ −1)/σ + (1 − α ) 

(17)


and resource constraint (16) reads: kt = y t − ct − ( n + γ + δ )kt .

We now embed the described technology into a market economy with perfect competition.
The representative firm chooses inputs so as to maximize the profit for a given real wage,
wt =
∂Yt / ∂Lt , and capital rental rate, qt =
∂Yt / ∂K t . That is, the rate of return on holding
capital is given by r=
qt − δ .
t

4.2 Behavior of the saving rate

From (10) and (17), the saving rate becomes

st = 1 −

t +h
ct
= 1 − ∆ −1  kt y t + ∫ w t y t e − ( rt −γ −n )(τ −t ) dτ  ,


t
y t
(σ −1)/σ

=
rt α A
where

σ /(σ −1)
1−α
kt−1/σ y t1/σ − δ =
, w t
( rt + δ )kt1/σ=
, y t A α kt(σ −1)/σ + (1 − α ) 
.
α

(18)

As an economy develops (when kt increases over time), whether the saving rate increases or
decreases (possibly non-monotonically) along the transition path depends on whether ct
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increases by more or by less than y t . In general, the behavior of the saving rate is
complicated along the transition path as a substitution effect opposes an income effect. As the
return on saving declines, ceteris paribus households tend to lower the saving rate over time
(substitution effect). At the same time, as kt rises, the difference between current and
permanent income decreases. The desire for consumption smoothing requires a household in
an economy distant from the steady state to consume more relative to actual income than a
household in an economy close to the steady state. As the economy develops, then,
consumption relative to income declines. This income effect tends to raise the saving rate over
time.

For the special case of Cobb-Douglas production, it has been demonstrated by Barro and Salai-Martin (2004, p.135 ff) that the dynamics of the saving rate is always monotonic – a
counterfactual prediction, as shown in Section 2. For the more general case of CES
production, however, Smetters (2003) and Gómez (2008) demonstrate that for important cases
the transitional path of the saving rate exhibits a hump. 4 Specifically, they analyze the
dynamics of zt ≡ ct / y t in a framework with an infinite planning horizon, perfect foresight,
and exponential discounting. In such a framework, if σ < 1 , the z ( r, z ) = 0 locus typically
exhibits a U-shaped pattern in ( r, z ) space. Let the minimum of the z ( r, z ) = 0 locus occur at
( r0 , z0 ) . If parameters are such that z0 > 0 and r * < r0 (with r * representing the steady state
rate of interest), then the saddle path is U-shaped in ( r, z ) space. That is, as kt increases over
time, st = 1 − zt increases first and decreases later on. The transitional path of st exhibits a
saving rate hump (Gómez 2008, pp. 203f).

Numerical simulations employing the framework with CES production and exponential
discounting, however, show that for reasonable parameterizations the saving rate humps have
very small amplitudes. These amplitudes are not consistent with the much larger amplitudes
shown by empirical evidence (Section 2).

The consideration of hyperbolic discounting in the framework with short-term planning and
CES production adds a third effect that we term hyperbolic discounting effect. This additional
4

We refer to the hump in the transitional path of the saving rate as the saving rate hump.
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effect tends to heighten the saving hump. As shown in the following section, the hyperbolic
discounting effect allows for amplitudes of the saving rate hump that are consistent with the
empirical evidence.

In the following, we compare the propensities to consume between a hyperbolic- and an
exponential discounter. The hyperbolic discounting effect is caused by the fact that the change
in the propensity to consume over time differs between exponential and hyperbolic discount
functions, irrespective of whether (4) is satisfied or not. 5 Specifically, consider the integrals of
the exponentiated discount functions:
hρ
1
− E 

1−


θ 1 − e θ 
θ  −1 + (1 + hβρ 0 ) βθ 
h
h
1/θ
1/θ

,

 .
=
∫0 DH (τ ) dτ =
∫0 DE (τ ) dτ
ρE
( −1 + βθ ) ρ 0

Assumption 1. β ≥ 1, θ > 1

(19)

(A.1)

Assumption 1 mildly restricts regular discount functions to those consistent with classical
hyperbolic discounting or those for which the discount rate declines more strongly as
compared to classical hyperbolic discounting. The restriction on the elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of less than unity. 6
Under (A.1) – for a given wealth (in (18), the term in square brackets) – the income effect
exceeds the substitution effect. That is, holding the wealth constant, as kt increases, the
saving rate rises. However, as kt increases, so does wealth, as seen by the term in square
brackets in (18). 7 This wealth effect raises the consumption share in income and thereby
lowers the saving rate.

5

Considering (18), the hyperbolic discounting effect is not related to the wealth to income ratio.

6

That θ > 1 is overwhelmingly suggested by the literature. Hall (1988, p. 350) favors a value of (at least)

.
7

It can easily be veryfied from (18) that, given the CES production technology, both kt y t and w t y t are

increasing functions of kt .
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The following three lemmas are useful for characterizing the hyperbolic discounting effect
(see Proposition 2).

Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then,
h

h

0

0

lim β →0 ∫ DH (τ )1/θ dτ = ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ .
Proof.

Consider (19). Taking the limit of

∫

h

0

DH (τ )1/θ dτ as β approaches zero directly

yields the result. ||
The lemma confirms that the known limit result lim β →0 DH (τ ) = DE (τ ) extends to the integral
of the exponentiated discount functions. Exponential discounting, in the version presented in
Lemma 1, remains the special case of hyperbolic discounting in which β = 0 .

Lemma 2. The integral

∫

h

0

DH (τ )1/θ dτ rises in beta.

Proof. See Appendix. ||

h

Lemma 2 states that the overall level of impatience – that is, 1 − ∫ DH (τ )1/θ dτ – is the lower
0

the higher is the rate of decline of the hyperbolic discount rate (the higher is β ).

Lemma 3.

Let the weight E ( rt ,τ ) ≡ e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t )
 θ


. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and τ > t .

Then:
∂ E ( rt ,τ ) ∂ E ( rt ,τ ) ∂ rt
(i)
=
> 0;
∂ rt
∂ kt
∂ kt

(ii) lim k →∞ E ( rt ,τ ) ≥ 1 ;
t
(iii) lim k →0 E ( rt ,τ ) = 
t
0

< 1
Proof.

for σ ≥ 1
for σ < 1

.

(i) Follows from the assumption that θ > 1 .

lim kt →∞ E ( rt ,τ ) = 1 . If n + δ > 0 , lim kt →∞ E ( rt ,τ ) > 1 .
0< lim k →0 rt < ∞ . The result directly follows. ||
t
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(ii) lim k →∞ y '( k ) = 0 . If n + δ =
0,
t
(iii) If σ ≥ 1 , lim k →0 rt = ∞ . If σ < 1 ,
t

Lemma 3 shows that as an economy develops (as kt increases) the weight E ( rt ,τ ) strictly
monotonically increases. For a very high rate of interest E ( rt ,τ ) ≈ 0 , and for a very low rate
of interest E ( rt ,τ ) ≈ 1 .

Proposition 2. (Hyperbolic discounting effect) Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then
∆H ≡ ∫

t +h

t

1/θ

DH (τ − t ) e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t )
 θ


dτ ≥ ∫

t +h

t

1/θ

DE (τ − t ) e

 θ −1

−
rt − n (τ −t )
 θ


dτ ≡ ∆ E .

Specifically, if E ( rt ,τ ) > 0 , the inequality is strict: ∆ H > ∆ E . Moreover, as an economy
develops (as kt increases over time), the strictly positive difference ∆ H − ∆ E > 0 becomes
larger.

Proof. See Appendix. ||

Proposition 2 defines the hyperbolic discounting effect as the increasing difference over time
in the change of the propensity to consume between exponential and hyperbolic discount
functions. As shown in the proof of the proposition, the difference is due to the fact that
compensation rule (4) for the exponential discount rate ρ E ( β ) refers to the integrals

∫

t +h

t

D (τ − t ) dτ , not to the exponentiated integrals

equalizes

∫

t +h

t

DH (τ − t ) dτ and

∫

t +h

t

∫

t +h

t

D (τ − t )1/θ dτ . That is, ρ E ( β )

DE (τ − t ) dτ , but not the integrals of the exponentiated

discount functions. Let ρ E |θ >1 be the exponential discount rate that equalizes the integrals of
the exponentiated discount functions. Generally=
ρ E |θ 1 ≠ ρ E |θ >1 . As shown in the proof,

ρ | > ρ E |θ >1 . As the propensities to consume depend on the exponentiated discount

=
E θ 1

functions, generally ∆ H ≠ ∆ E . With θ > 1 , the adjusted – according to (4) – exponential
discount rate is larger than the one required to equalize the integrals of the exponentiated
discount functions. Therefore, ∆ H > ∆ E .
The increase in the difference ( ∆ H − ∆ E ) > 0 over time is due to the weight E ( rt ,τ ) . With

θ > 1 , the income effect dominates the substitution effect, and as rt declines over time
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E ( rt ,τ ) rises over time (thereby lowering the propensity to consume). The rise in E ( rt ,τ )
increases the difference ∆ H − ∆ E over time.
The propensity to consume is given by ∆ −1 . As kt increases over time, the hyperbolic
discounting effect lowers the propensity to consume in a hyperbolic discounting framework
relative to an exponential discounting framework. That is, as kt increases over time, the
hyperbolic discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate relative to a framework with
exponential discounting, and thereby tends to heighten the saving hump.

Intuitively, a declining discount rate over time affects the intertemporal substitution effect. At
any per capita income level, future consumption becomes more attractive as it is less strongly
discounted relative to exponential discounting. This hyperbolic discounting effect encourages
a higher saving rate, and hence investment in capital accumulation. At the same time, the
induced higher saving rate and resulting faster capital accumulation yields higher per capita
income level at any future date (again relative to that under the exponential case), which in
turn raises the above-mentioned wealth effect, tending to lower the saving rate, according to
(18).

The critical consideration in explaining possible dynamics of the saving rate over time is to
know how these opposing effects of a declining discount rate themselves change over time as,
on the one hand, the discount rate decreases with time and the per capita income rises on the
other hand. Obviously, the extent of the hump and its timing depend critically on the
particular hyperbolic discount function assumed (the value of the hyperbolic discounting
coefficient β ), on the utility function assumed (value of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution), and on the production function used (implying how fast output per head grows
as capital is accumulated). Thus, for example, depending on the assumed values of
parameters, it may be the case that the hump in the savings rate occurs relatively soon but is
not very pronounced, or alternatively it may occur after a longer period of time with a higher
hump, or various other possible combinations of these, each reflecting the experience of
different countries as they have developed. It may also be the case that for a set of parameter
values, the hump does not occur, implying that either the intertemporal substitution or wealth
effect dominates for a very long time period.
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Taking the hyperbolic discounting effect into account, in addition to the substitution and
income (wealth) effects, may give rise to a humped transitional path of the saving rate – even
with Cobb-Douglas production technology. The numerical simulations presented in the next
section address the question of the quantitative impact of hyperbolic discounting on the saving
rate hump.

5. Results from numerical simulations

Proposition 2 implies the qualitative result that the hyperbolic discounting effect tends to
heighten the saving rate hump. Considering reasonable calibrations, three main quantitative
questions suggest themselves. First, by how much does the introduction of hyperbolic
discounting (a rise in β ) heighten the saving rate hump? Second, how does the length of the
planning horizon affect the saving rate hump? Third, how different is the saving rate hump
between exponential and hyperbolic discounting in a controlled experiment? The numerical
simulations that follow address these questions.
To that end, we consider an adverse shock on the predetermined state variable k . At time
zero, starting from an initial steady state, we reduce the value of the predetermined variable.
The resulting time paths show the non-linearized transitions of the saving rate (and other
variables of interest) from far away from the steady state to the steady state equilibrium.
These transition paths are interpreted as showing the development of the saving rate (and
other variables) as a country develops, i.e., as its stock of capital k increases. 8

Table 4. Baseline values of background parameters
Preference parameters

ρ 0 = 0.06 , θ = 5

Production parameters

A = 2 , α = 0.7 , γ = 0.02 , δ = 0.06 , σ = 0.8

Population growth rate

n = 0.01

8

We employ the Mathematica implementation of the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008) to produce

the numerical results documented in this paper. The code is available from the authors upon request. Notice that
the shock is introduced on the state variable, not on a specific parameter. All parameters take on the same values
before and after the shock.
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Note. The hyperbolic discounting coefficient, β , as well as the planning horizon h vary
across simulations.
What we call baseline values of the background parameters are listed in Table 4. The graphs
below are based on these parameter values, which may be considered standard and
noncontroversial. Notice that ρ 0 represents the hyperbolic discount rate at τ = 0 . The value
for the elasticity of marginal utility is in line with the estimate of Hall (1988, p.350).
The parameters of primary interest are β and h . The empirical literature does not provide
firm conclusions as to possible magnitudes of these parameters. To clarify the potential
quantitative roles of β and h for the saving rate hump, we consider different values of these
parameters in the numerical simulations.
For β = 50 and h = 50 , together with the baseline values of the background parameters,
important stylized facts for a modern industrialized economy are reproduced by the model.
Per capita consumption grows at a rate of 2% per year, around 25% of output is devoted to
investment, and the output-capital ratio is 0.37 in steady state.

Figure 3, presents transition paths of the saving rates for the baseline values of background
parameters and for various values of β . The calculations of the transition paths are based on
the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008).
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Figure 4. The saving rate hump as the hyperbolic discounting coefficient β rises.
Notes. h = 50 .

Result 1. The amplitude of the saving rate hump significantly increases in the hyperbolic
discounting coefficient β . A value of β = 50 implies an amplitude of the saving hump that
accords with empirical evidence.

The figure shows the saving rate hump for various values of the hyperbolic discounting
coefficient. The amplitude of the saving rate hump increases in β . This effect of hyperbolic
discounting was already identified, qualitatively, in Proposition 2. Quantitatively, the figure
suggests a very small amplitude of the saving rate hump for small values of the hyperbolic
discounting coefficient. For example, β = 2 ( β < 2 ) implies an amplitude of roughly one
(less than one) percentage point. Higher values of β imply a much larger amplitude. β = 50
( β > 50 ) implies an amplitude of about four (more than four) percentage points. 9 The latter
amplitudes correspond well with empirical evidence.

Figure 5. The saving rate hump as the planning horizon parameter h rises.
Notes. β = 50 .

9

A lower initial value of the hyperbolic discount rate further accentuates the saving rate hump.
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It is worth emphasizing that even if β is close to zero, the model does imply a saving rate
hump. The existence of such a hump under a CES production technology was already
demonstrated by Smetters (2003) and Gómez (2008). However, as indicated by Figure 4, the
implied saving rate hump is significantly smaller as compared with empirical evidence.

The second quantitative question refers to the sensitivity of the above result with respect to
the length of the planning horizon, h .

Result 2. The planning horizon parameter h strongly affects both the amplitude of the saving
rate hump as well as the steady state level of the saving rate. A rise in h raises the steady
state saving rate.

Figure 5 shows the saving rate hump for various values of the short-term planning horizon
parameter h . For given β , a rise in h raises

∫

t +h

t

1/θ

θ  −1 + (1 + β hρ 0 )( βθ −1)/ βθ 

DH (τ − t ) dτ =

( βθ − 1) ρ 0

,

thereby increasing ∆ H and lowering the propensity to consume ∆ −H1 . According to (18), the
lower propensity to consume raises the saving rate both along the (hump-shaped) transitional
path and in steady state.
The figure suggests that for β = 50 together with the baseline values of the background
parameters, a value of the short-term planning horizon parameter of h = 50 implies a saving
rate hump that is consistent with empirical evidence. Too low a value of h results in a steady
state saving rate too low as to be empirically supported (cf. h = 5 in Figure 5). Too high a
value of h results in a very large steady state saving rate. As a consequence, the amplitude of
the saving rate – viewed as difference between the peak of the saving rate hump and the
steady state level of the saving rate – becomes lower as suggested by empirical evidence.

The final quantitative question refers to the difference between hyperbolic- and exponential
discounting in a controlled experiment, that is when the exponential discount rate is adjusted
such that the overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions. The
numerical simulations are based on the baseline values of the background parameters. For a
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fixed initial value of the hyperbolic discount rate, ρ 0 , and a given β , the corresponding
adjusted exponential discount rate is calculated. The following table shows the parameter
specifications for β , ρ 0 , ρ E employed in the simulations.
Table 5. Adjusted exponential discount rates ρ E

β =2

β = 20

β = 50

ρ 0 = 0.06

0.0270

0.0065

0.0033

ρ 0 = 0.20

0.0516

0.0089

0.0043

Note. The overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions; h = 50 .

Table 5 shows that for reasonable values of the hyperbolic discounting coefficient β , the
adjusted exponential discount rate becomes very small, independently of whether the initial
hyperbolic discount rate is relatively “small” ( ρ 0 = 0.06 ) or “large” ( ρ 0 = 0.2 ). Specifically,
for our preferred value of β = 50 , the adjusted exponential discount rate is close to zero
(below 0.005 ) for both initial hyperbolic discount rates.
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Figure 6. The saving rate hump under exponential- and hyperbolic discounting.
Notes. The exponential discount rate is adjusted such that the overall level of impatience is the same
under both discount functions.

Figure 6 suggests two important insights. First, the saving rate paths under hyperbolic and
adjusted exponential discounting are similar in all cases. In fact, under θ = 1 , the paths would
coincide, according to Corollary 2(i). However, with θ ≠ 1 , observational equivalence is ruled
out by Proposition 1. That is, the difference between the saving rate paths implied by adjusted
exponential versus hyperbolic discounting is entirely due to the fact that θ > 1 in the
simulations.
Second, as seen for β = 50 , adjusted exponential discounting implies a saving rate hump of
the same magnitude as hyperbolic discounting. That is, not only hyperbolic discounting tends
to raise the amplitude of the saving rate but so does also an exceedingly low exponential
discount rate. The latter effect is due to the fact that a low(ering of the) discount rate weakens
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the substitution effect by which the saving rate tends to decline as kt increases (as the rate of
interest declines). However, as shown in Table 5, the adjusted exponential discount rate
required to produce a saving rate hump of the right magnitude (with β = 50 ) must be
extremely small. For ρ 0 = 0.06 , the adjusted exponential discount rate equals ρ E = 0.003 ,
which corresponds to only about one tenth of what is considered a standard estimate of the
exponential discount rate (in a standard Ramsey model).

As a consequence, for the baseline values of the background parameters, a saving rate hump
of the right magnitude is implied by two frameworks: (i) a model with hyperbolic discounting
with ρ 0 = 0.06 and β = 50 ; (ii) a model with exponential discounting with ρ E = 0.003 . It
must be emphasized though, that in the model with exponential discounting, a constant
discount rate of ρ E = 0.003 is not considered a sensible estimate.
All of these results hold irrespective of whether ρ 0 is “small” or “large”. We summarize these
results in

Result 3. (Controlled experiments) If the exponential discount rate is adjusted so that the
overall level of impatience is the same under both discount functions:
(i) the implied transitional paths of the saving rate is similar in both models (exponential and
hyperbolic discounting);
(ii) the value of the adjusted exponential discount rate that is needed to imply a saving rate
hump of the right magnitude is only about one tenth of what is considered a standard estimate
of the exponential discount rate.

6. Conclusions

Our paper considers the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the humped transitional
dynamics of the saving rate. The standard neoclassical growth model with Cobb-Douglas
technology exhibits – for a reasonable calibration – a monotonously declining transition path
of the saving rate, as per capita incomes increase. This property is counterfactual and
therefore unappealing for the analysis of policy shocks on transitional dynamics of an
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economy. In response, the prior literature shows that the saving rate exhibits a humped
transitional dynamics in a neoclassical growth model with CES production technology. For a
reasonable calibration, however, the amplitude of the hump implied by a framework with
exponential discounting – roughly one percentage point – falls significantly short of an
amplitude of roughly five percentage points, as suggested by empirical evidence. In our paper,
we show that the introduction of hyperbolic discounting (as opposed to exponential
discounting) amplifies the magnitude of the implied hump in the saving rate dynamics.
Specifically, according to the numerical simulations, our framework with hyperbolic
discounting implies an amplitude of the saving rate hump well fitting the empirical evidence.

The main mechanism at work is a hyperbolic discounting effect that is not present in a
framework with exponential discounting. The hyperbolic discounting effect works via the
propensity to consume out of wealth. If the elasticity of marginal utility, θ , differs from
unity, the propensity to consume is not constant over time. Specifically, if θ > 1 , the
propensity to consume decreases, over time, by more in a framework with hyperbolic
discounting than in the same framework with exponential discounting. Other things equal, this
hyperbolic discounting effect tends to raise the saving rate over time. Eventually, the
hyperbolic discounting effect is dominated by the intertemporal substitution effect that tends
to lower the saving rate (as the rate of interest declines) over time.

For the analysis of the effects of hyperbolic discounting we introduce the concept of a regular
discount function. The class of regular discount functions captures all cases in which the
second order growth rate of the discount rate is a constant multiple of the first-order growth
rate. Most discounting specifications employed in the prior literature are special cases of the
class of regular discount functions.

Several questions are open for future research. First, considering the general class of regular
discount functions, empirical estimates of the key parameter, β , are scarcely available, if any.
A robust estimate of β would greatly help to apply a framework with hyperbolic discounting
to economic analyses of all kinds. Second, in the present paper, the saving rate was defined to
be the difference between income and consumption relative to income. In a more
sophisticated framework, at least one addition is warranted: a public sector. Clearly, a public
sector interacts with a household’s saving rate. Specifically, the introduction of social security
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systems over the last 50 years, in many countries, probably has affected the development of
saving rates. Notwithstanding these open questions, we still hope to have shed some light on
the impact of hyperbolic discounting on saving rate dynamics in a neoclassical growth model.

7. Appendix

A.1 Exponential discount rate in a “controlled” experiment
Considering (2) and (4), for any given hyperbolic discount rate at τ = 0 , ρ 0 , the exponential
discount rate satisfying (4) is given by

1

ρE (β )
=

ρ 0 ( β − 1)(1 + hβρ 0 ) β
1

1 − (1 + hβρ 0 ) β

−1

−1

 hρ0 ( β −1) 1

1−
1−(1+ h βρ 0 ) β

e
hρ 0 ( β − 1) 
1

.
+ ProductLog
1
h
 1 − (1 + hβρ )1− β 
0





(20)

As β → 0 , it follows that ρ E → ρ 0 .

A.2 The optimal (time-inconsistent) consumption plan as seen from t0
At t = t0 , the Hamiltonian of the control problem becomes:
ct1−θ − 1 nt
H ( ct=
e D (t − t0 ) + µt [( rt − n )kt + wt − ct ] , t ∈ [ t0 , t0 + h ] .
, kt , µt ; t0 )
1−θ
The Maximum principle implies:
−( rt − n ),
ct µt−1/θ L1/t θ D (t − t0 )1/θ . As µ t / µt =
=
=
ct µt−0 1/θ e R ( t ,t0 )/θ L1/t θ D (t − t0 )1/θ ,
ˆ

(21)

t

with Rˆ (t , t0 ) ≡ ∫ ( rt0 − n )dt =( rt0 − n )(t − t0 ) , as households consider the rate of interest – as
t0

seen from t0 – fixed. Considering (21) in the flow budget constraint (6) yields
ˆ
kt − ( rt − n )kt = wt − µt−0 1/θ e R ( t ,t0 )/θ L1/t θ D (t − t0 )1/θ ,

the solution of which reads:
t

ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
kt = kt0 e R ( t ,t0 ) + ∫  wτ − µt−0 1/θ e R (τ ,t0 )/θ L1/τ θ D (τ − t0 )1/θ  e − R (τ ,t ) dτ .

t0 
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(22)

Next, we transform variables into units of effective labor, denoted by a tilde. Let the
exogenous rate of technical progress be given by γ , then: xt ≡ xt e −γ t , x ∈ {k , w, c} . Then,
(22) becomes:
t
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
=
kt kt0 e R ( t ,t0 )−γ ( t −t0 ) + ∫  w τ − µt−0 1/θ e R (τ ,t0 )/θ L1/τ θ e −γτ D (τ − t0 )1/θ  e − R (τ ,t )+γ (τ −t ) dτ .

t0 

(23)

Considering (23) together with the terminal condition kt0 + h = 0 , and solving for the costate
variable yields:

µt−1/θ =
0

t0 + h
ˆ
kt0 + ∫ w τ e − R (τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 ) dτ
t0

∫

t0 + h

t0

1/θ

D (τ − t0 ) e

−

θ −1 ˆ
R (τ ,t0 ) −γ t0 + n /θ τ
θ

.

(24)

dτ

Considering (24) in (21) yields an expression for planned consumption as seen from t0 :
c (t | t0 )

t0 + h
ˆ
kt0 + ∫ w τ e − R (τ ,t0 )+γ (τ −t0 ) dτ
t0

∫

t0 + h

θ −1 ˆ
R (τ ,t0 ) −γ t0 + n /θ τ
−
1/θ
θ

D (τ − t0 ) e

t0

e R ( t ,t0 )/θ L1/t θ D (t − t0 )1/θ .
ˆ

dτ

||

A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let h ∈ 

++

. The exponentiated discount function DH (τ )1/θ : [0, h ] → [0,1] is strictly

monotonically decreasing. DH (0) = 1 , and as long as β , θ < ∞ , DH (h)1/θ > 0 . Consider

β1 > β 0 . For every τ > 0 , a rise in β from β 0 to β1 lowers the hyperbolic discount rate ρτ .
As a consequence, graphically speaking, the discount curve DH (τ ; β1 )1/θ is located weakly
above DH (τ ; β 0 )1/θ , and it is located strictly above DH (τ ; β 0 )1/θ for all τ > 0 . The area below
the curves, then, must be larger under DH (τ ; β1 )1/θ than under DH (τ ; β 0 )1/θ , that is,

∫

h

0

h

DH (τ ; β1 )1/θ dτ > ∫ DH (τ ; β 0 )1/θ dτ . ||
0

A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Suppose E ( rt ,τ ) = 0 . Then, the weak inequality in Proposition 2 becomes
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∫

t +h

t

=

t +h

1/θ
DH (τ − t )1/θ E ( rt ,τ ) dτ =
∫ DE (τ − t ) E (rt ,τ ) dτ
t

∫

t +h

t

 DH (τ − t )1/θ − DE (τ − t )1/θ  E ( rt ,τ=
) dτ 0.

(ii) Suppose E ( rt ,τ ) > 0 . We want to show that ∆ H > ∆ E .

∆H > ∆E ⇔

∫

t +h

t

 DH (τ − t )1/θ − DE (τ − t )1/θ  E ( rt ,τ ) dτ > 0.

(25)

A sufficient condition for the strict inequality to hold is:

∫

t +h

t

 DH (τ − t )1/θ − DE (τ − t )1/θ  dτ > 0 ⇔

∫

h

h

DH (τ )1/θ dτ > ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ .

0

(26)

0

The right hand side of the equivalence follows from the fact that the discount functions are
independent of calendar time. Two cases have to be distinguished.
Case (ii.a) ρ E = ρ 0 , where ρ 0 denotes the hyperbolic discount rate at τ = 0 . In this case, the
exponential discount rate is not adjusted so that the overall level of impatience is the same for
h

h

0

0

exponential and hyperbolic discounters. By Lemma 1, lim β →0 ∫ DH (τ )1/θ dτ = ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ .
∂  h
DH (τ )1/θ dτ  > 0 . Hyperbolic discounting occurs when β > 0 .
∫

0


∂β

By Lemma 2,
Consequently,

∫

h

h

DH (τ )1/θ dτ > ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ , and the sufficient condition (26) holds.

0

0

Case (ii.b) ρ E ( β ) is adjusted so that the overall level of impatience is the same for
exponential and hyperbolic discounters, and (4) is satisfied. Notice that

∫

h

0

DE (τ )1/θ

necessarily declines in ρ E . The higher the discount rate the lower the discount factor DE for
all τ > 0 , and the lower the area under the curve DE (τ ) . A sufficient condition for (26) to
hold is:

ρ E ( β ) |θ >1 < ρ E ( β ) |θ =
1.

(27)

Adjustment rule (4) requires the exponential discount rate to be adjusted according to

ρ E ( β ) |θ =1 .

∫

h

0

ρ E ( β ) |θ >1

Let

be

the

exponential

discount

rate

for

which

h

DH (τ )1/θ dτ = ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ . Under condition (27), if instead the larger ρ E ( β ) |θ =1 is applied
0

– as required by adjustment rule (4) – it follows that
to validate (27), we calculate

33

∫

h

0

h

DH (τ )1/θ dτ > ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ . In order
0

1

=
ρ E |θ >1

ρ 0 ( βθ − 1)(1 + hβρ 0 ) βθ
1

1 − (1 + hβρ 0 ) βθ

−1

−1

  hρ0 ( βθ −1) 1 

 θ 1−(1+ hβρ0 )1− βθ 


hρ 0 ( βθ − 1) 
θ
e 
+ ProductLog 
 .
1
1−
h


 θ  1 − (1 + hβρ 0 ) βθ  

 




(28)

Consider ρ E |θ >1 as a function of θ , ρ E |θ >1 (θ ) . Then, the following two properties are easily
verified: (a) limθ →1 ρ E |θ >1 (θ ) = ρ E |θ =
1 ; (b)

∂
ρ E |θ >1 (θ ) < 0 . Thus, inequality (27) holds. As
∂θ

a consequence, considering (26) and (25), ∆ H > ∆ E .

(iii) Steps (i) and (ii) establish that

∫

h

0

h

DH (τ )1/θ dτ > ∫ DE (τ )1/θ dτ . That is, for E ( rt ,τ ) > 0 ,
0

(25) holds: ∆ H > ∆ E . As kt increases (as rt decreases) the weight E ( rt ,τ ) increases,
according to Lemma 3. That is, the positive difference

∫

h

0

 DH (τ )1/θ − DE (τ )1/θ  dτ is

multiplied with an increasing strict positive weight E ( rt ,τ ) as kt increases. Consequently, as

kt rises, the strictly positive difference ( ∆ H − ∆ E ) increases. ||
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